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Abstract
This is an investigation of stochastic choice when only the average of the choices is
observable. For example when one observes aggregate sales numbers from a store, but
not the frequency with which each item was purchased. The focus of our work is on the
Luce model, also known as the Logit model. We show that a simple path independence
property of average choice uniquely characterizes the Luce model. We also characterize
the linear Luce mode, using similar tools. A linear version of the Luce model is used
most frequently in empirical work by applied economists.
Our characterization is based on the property of path independence, which runs
counter to early impossibility results on path independent choice. From an empirical
perspective, our results provide a small-sample advantage over the tests of Luce’s model
that rely on estimating choice frequences.
JEL classification numbers: D01,D10
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1. Introduction
We investigate the meaning of stochastic choice theory for data on average choices. Ag-
gregate or average choices are often available when exact choice frequencies are unobserv-
able. Such aggregate statistics are not only easy to obtain, but also easier to estimate
efficiently than are choice frequencies. Taking average choice as primitive, we introduce
a novel characterization of the ubiquitous Luce, or Logit model of discrete choice.
The crucial property for the Luce model is a weak version of path independence.
Classic path independence requires choices to be recursive moving from subsets to larger
sets. In particular, first making two selection from two disjoint sets and then choosing
among the pair of selections leads to the final outcome as immediately selecting from the
union of these sets. For example in a supermarket we may choose Camembert cheese
from the cheese section. Then choose from a simplified representation of the supermarket
in which Camembert is the only cheese available. Our notion of path independence is
weaker, requiring the average choice to be any convex combination of the average choices
from a partition of the set, rather than requiring the average choice to be the average
choice from the average choice.
Our result is surprising because path independence was thought to be too strong a
property to impose on average choice. Path independence was first proposed by Plott
(1973), who used it to characterize rational choice in an abstract environment. Kalai and
Megiddo (1980) and Machina and Parks (1981) consider path independence for average
choice, essentially the same primitive as we assume in our paper. These papers present
impossibility theorems. They conclude that no continuous average choice can satisfy Plott
path independence. We consider a weakening of path independence, where the average
choice from a set must be a convex combination (a lottery) of the average choices from a
partition of the set in two. It does not need to coincide with the average choice one would
make when faced only with the two average choices. See Section 4.2 for a comparison of
the two axioms.
Our weakening of path independence not only avoids the impossibility result, but
together with continuity it pins down the Luce model uniquely. Our main result says
that the unique average choice that satisfies continuity and path independence is the
Luce average rule.
We proceed to expand on why average choices are a reasonable primitive for stochastic
choice, then explain our main contributions in some detail, and finally discuss some
related literature.
Average choices. We may often observe aggregate data on random choice, and not
the actual choice probabilities. There are two interpretations of the model of random
choice, and in each case it makes sense to think that one may be able to observe average
choice instead of choice probabilities.
The first interpretation of random choice is that it reflects the choice frequencies of a
population of individual agents. While each individual has determinate choice behavior,
the randomness of the choice function records population-level heterogeneity. We claim
that one may often actually observe the aggregate quantities chosen and not the choice
frequencies. For example, the ratio of wine sales to total revenue at a supermarket can
be immediately read from a balance sheet without observing each shopper’s receipt. The
average choice economizes on describing each product’s distribution of sales (it does not
require knowing how many shoppers bought over a dozen bottles of wine) and on describ-
ing each product’s correlation with others (it does not require knowing how frequently
cheese is purchased with wine).
The store example makes sense if we interpret random choice as the behavior of a
population of individuals, each one with an idiosyncratic choice behavior. We may instead
focus on a single individual, who may have different choice behaviors at different points
in time. But even for a single individual it is reasonable to think that we can observe
average choice and not choice frequencies. For example we may ask an individual how
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much wine, cheese and meat they purchased last month. This is much easier to answer
compared to the detailed record of each trip to the store that would be required to
compile information on choice frequencies.
Finally, even if one has information on choice frequencies it is statistically desirable
to use a test based on average choice. Studies of stochastic choice take population choice
probabilities as known. But in actual applications of the theory one only observes a
finite sample of choices. It is therefore important to understand how one would test
for the axioms that characterize the theory, given a finite-sample approximation to the
population stochastic choice probabilities.
The average is statistically very well behaved while the main alternative to our charac-
terization uses relative probabilities; these have much poorer qualities as a test statistic.
The alternative to our test is Luce’s axiomatization, based on testing for the independence
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Testing IIA requires estimating relative choice probabili-
ties: these are statistically more complicated objects than the average. In small samples
they are hard to estimate robustly, and even with a large sample their estimators can
have an arbitrarily large variance. We discuss these issues in detail in Section 4.4.
In fact, Luce (1959) already makes this point. Luce makes a very similar calculation to
our calculations in Section 4.4, and concludes that a reliable test based on his IIA axiom
woud require very large datasets: Sample sizes of the order of several thousands. This
would render the tests inapplicable in most experimental setups.1 Our axiomatization,
based on average choice, is in that sense much better behaved because averages can be
estimated more efficiently than fractions of probabilities.
Contributions. Our main contribution is an axiomatic characterization of the Luce
model when the primitive is average choice. The Luce model is very important in eco-
nomics, and very heavily used by applied economists and practitioners.
Our axiomatization is based on path independence, as described in the beginning of
the introduction. The axiomatization is useful as a statistical test for the Luce model
because data on average choices are a) available when data on choice frequencies are not,
and b) more robustly estimated given data on choices.
1Luce suggests that one would use psychophysical experiments to obtain the kinds of sample sizes
needed to test IIA.
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The axiomatization is also useful because of what we learn about the Luce mode. Path
independence of average choice has been studied before, and the connection to Luce’s
IIA went unnoticed. As mentioned in the beginning of the introduction, the literature
concluded that path independence of average choice was too strong a property, and lead to
an impossibility result. So the fact that a weak version of path independence lies behind
the Luce model is probably surprising, and uncovers a new facet of the Luce model. In
the paper (Section 4.1) we discuss the relation between IIA and path independence, and
why one cannot prove our main result by simply showing that path independence must
imply the IIA.
Our second contribution is to provide the first axiomatization of the linear Luce
model. The Luce model (or Logit model) is ubiquitous in applied economics: It is taught
to every first-year graduate student; and it is the basic go-to specification for the demand
side of most structural economic models. But the version of the model that is actually
empirically estimated assumes that utility is linear in object attributes. As far as we
know, the full empirical content of this model has not been investigated until now. For
example, in McFadden (1974), the influential paper that lays out the Logit model as an
empirical strategy, linearity is postulated as an axiom (McFadden’s Axiom 4).
We show that an average choice version of the von-Neumann Morgenstern indepen-
dence axiom ensures that the Luce utility function is ordinally equivalent to a linear
function. After discussing this axiom, we turn to a kind of calibration axiom that en-
sures that the Luce utility is affinely equivalent to a linear utility. These axioms, together
with continuity and path independence, constitute the content of the linear Luce model
for average choice.
Related Literature. The papers that are closely related to ours are: Luce (1959),
Plott (1973), Kalai and Megiddo (1980), and Machina and Parks (1981). These have been
discussed above. In particular, the papers by Kalai and Megiddo (1980) and Machina
and Parks (1981) use the same primitive as we do, and argue that path independence
gives rise to an impossibility. We weaken path independence and find that it gives rise
to the Luce rule. Section 4.2 explains the Plott path independence axiom in detail, and
gives a simplified explanation behind the impossibility results.
The literature on path independent choice is large. Notable contributions include the
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work of Blair (1975), Parks (1976), and Ferejohn and Grether (1977). This work follows
Plott in assuming an environment of abstract choice, without the linear structure that is
part of our primitives.
The linear Luce model is the standard econometric specification of the Luce, or Logit
model. A discussion can be found in any econometric textbook: see for example Greene
(2003). The Logit model as an empirical strategy is laid out in McFadden (1974). We
are apparently the first to investigate the behavioral content of the linearity assumption
in the Luce model.
2. Average choice and the Luce model
2.1. Notation
Definitions of mathematical terms are in Section 5.1.
If A ⊆ Rn, then convA denotes the the set of all convex combinations of elements in
A, termed the convex hull of A. Let conv0A denote the relative interior of convA.
A binary relation on a set is called a preference relation if it is complete and transitive
(in other words, if it is a weak order).
Let Y be a set. Then f : Y → R+ is a finite support measure on Y if there is a
finite subset A ⊆ Y such that f(x) = 0 for x /∈ A. In this case we say that the set A
is a support for f . A finite support measure may have more than one support. If f in
addition satisfies that
∑
x∈A f(x) = 1 then we say that it is a finite support probability
measure on X. When Y is a finite set, we use the term lottery to refer to a finite support
probability measure.
Let ∆(Y ) denote the set of all finite support probability measures; and for A ⊂ Y ,
let ∆(A) denote the set of finite support measures that have support A. We shall only
discuss finite support probability measures, so we some times refer to them as probability
measures.
5
2.2. Primitives
Let X be a compact and convex subset of Rn, with n ≥ 3. An important special case is
when X is a set of lotteries, in that case there is a finite set P of prizes, and X = ∆(P )
is the set of all lotteries over P .
Let A be the set of all finite subsets of X.
An average choice is a function
ρ∗ : A → X,
such that, for all A ∈ A, ρ∗(A) is in conv0A, the relative interior of the convex hull of A.
The primitive of our study is an average choice.
2.3. Luce model
A stochastic choice is a function
ρ : A → ∆(X)
such that ρ(A) ∈ ∆(A).
A stochastic choice ρ : A → ∆(X) a continuous Luce rule if there is a continuous
function u : X → R++ such that
ρ(x,A) =
u(x)∑
y∈A u(y)
.
An average choice ρ∗ is continuous Luce rationalizable if there is a continuous Luce
rule ρ such that
ρ∗(A) =
∑
x∈A
xρ(x,A)
for all A ∈ A.
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2.4. A characterization of continuous Luce rationalizable average choices.
Our main axiom is a version of the path independence axiom proposed by Plott (1973).
Plott’s axiom says that choice is recursive, in the sense that choice from A∪B is obtained
by choosing first from A and B separately, and then from a set consisting of the two
chosen elements. The idea is that all that matters about A and B in A∪B are its “best”
elements, the element chosen from A and B. Plott worked in an environment of abstract
choice. For average choice, the same environment as we use in our paper, the papers by
Kalai and Megiddo (1980) and Machina and Parks (1981) argue that Plott’s axiom is
too strong. They show that Plott’s path independence gives an impossibility result. Our
result is that a natural weakening of Plott’s axiom does not give an impossibility but
instead pins down the Luce model.
Our notion of path independence is weaker than Plott’s, and says that the average
choice from A∪B is a convex combination of the average choice from A and the average
choice from B. Formally, our axiom is:
Path independence: If convA ∩ convB = ∅ then
ρ∗(A ∪B) ∈ conv0{ρ∗(A), ρ∗(B)}.
Our second axiom imposes a continuity property on average choice.
Continuity: Let x /∈ A. For any sequence xn in X, if x = limn→∞ xn, then
ρ∗(A ∪ {x}) = lim
n→∞
ρ∗(A ∪ {xn}).
(understood as weak* convergence ).
Continuity is a technical axiom but it raises some interesting issues related to choosing
among multiple copies of identical, or close to identical, objects. We discuss these in
Section 4.
Theorem 1. An average choice is continuous Luce rationalizable iff it satisfies continuity
and path independence.
We can gain some intuition for Theorem 1 from Figure 1. Essentially what happens
is that path independence pins down ρ∗(A) uniquely from the value of ρ∗(A′) when
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ρ∗(A \ {y})
ρ∗(A \ {x})
ρ∗(A)
Figure 1: The set A = {x, y, z, w, q, r}: ρ∗(A) is determined from path independence,
ρ∗(A \ {x}), and ρ∗(A \ {y})
A′ ( A.2 We build up a rationalizing Luce model from the average choice at sets of small
cardinality, and then use path independence to show that ρ∗ must always coincide with
the average choice generated from that Luce model.
Figure 1 shows how ρ∗(A) is uniquely determined. In the figure, the points x and y
are extreme points of conv(A), where A = {x, y, z, w, q, r}. Path independence says that
ρ∗(A) must lie on the line segment joining x and ρ∗(A \ {x}) and on the line segment
joining y and ρ∗(A\{y}). The main step in the proof (Lemma 6) establishes that, outside
of some “non-generic” sets A, the intersection of the line segments x—ρ∗(A \ {x}) and
y—ρ∗(A\{y}) is a singleton. This means that path indepence pins down ρ∗(A) uniquely
from ρ∗(A \ {x}) and ρ∗(A \ {y}).
Figure 1 illustrates why the line segments x—ρ∗(A \ {x}) and y—ρ∗(A \ {y}) have a
singleton intersection. We choose x and y to lie on a proper face of convA, so there is
a hyperplane supporting A at that face. If there were two points in the intersection of
x—ρ∗(A \ {x}) and y—ρ∗(A \ {y}), then all four points x, ρ∗(A \ {x}), y and ρ∗(A \ {y})
would lie in the same line. This implies that ρ∗(A \ {x}) and ρ∗(A \ {y}) lie on the
hyperplane as well. But since these two average choices are in the relative interior of the
respective sets, it implies that A also lies in the hyperplane. This is what we mean by A
being “not generic:” it means that convA does not have low dimension.
2See also the discussion in Section 4.1, where we compare path independence and Luce’s IIA, and
argue that we could not use IIA to the same effect as path independence.
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3. Linear Luce
We have mentioned the popularity of the Luce model among practitioners and empirical
economists. Interestingly, the version of the Luce model they estimate is linear in object
attributes. Here we turn our attention to such a linear model. Specifically, we consider
continuous Luce models in which:
• u(x) = f(v · x) with v ∈ Rn and f a continuous strictly monotonic function;
• or u(x) = v · x+ β, with v ∈ Rn and β ∈ R.
The first model we term the linear Luce model. The second is called the strictly affine
Luce model.
Our results on linear Luce and the strictly affine Luce model are the first axiomatic
characterizations of any version of Luce model that assumes linearity in object attributes,
the kind of Luce model that is usually estimated empirically.
3.1. Linear Luce
A stochastic choice ρ : A → ∆(X) a linear Luce rule if there is v ∈ Rn and a monotone
and continuous function f : R→ R++ such that
ρ(x,A) =
f(v · x)∑
y∈A f(v · y)
.
Consider the following axiom, which captures the kind of independence property that
is normally associated with von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory.
Independence: ρ∗({x, y}) = (1/2)x+ (1/2)y iff for all λ ∈ R and all z s.t. λx+ (1−
λ)z, λy + (1− λ)z ∈ X,
ρ∗({λx+ (1− λ)z, λy + (1− λ)z}) = λρ∗({x, y}) + (1− λ)z
Note that if ρ∗ is continuous Luce rationalizable with utility u, then u(x) = u(y)
iff ρ∗({x, y}) = (1/2)x + (1/2)y. So the meaning of the independence axiom is that
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u(x) = u(y) iff for all λ ∈ R and all z s.t. λx + (1 − λ)z, λy + (1 − λ)z ∈ X, ρ∗({λx +
(1− λ)z, λy + (1− λ)z}) = λρ∗({x, y}) + (1− λ)z.
The next diagram is a geometric illustration of independence. Note that the average
choice ρ∗(λx+ (1−λ)z, λy+ (1−λ)z) must be translated with λ from ρ∗(x, y). Since we
have u(x) = u(y), this will force a rationalizing rule to translate indifference curves in λ
in a similar fashion, so the indifference curves passing through the points λx + (1− λ)z
and λy + (1− λ)z), and through λ′x+ (1− λ′)z and λ′y + (1− λ)z′), must be translates
of the indifference curve passing through x and y.
x
y
z
ρ∗(λx + (1− λ)z, λy + (1− λ)z)
ρ∗(λ′x + (1− λ′)z, λ′y + (1− λ′)z)
ρ∗(x, y)
The independence axiom ensures that u satisfies von Neumann-Morgenstern inde-
pendence. The immediate implication of the axiom (Lemma 8) says that u satisfies a
weak version of independence, but this version can be shown to suffice for the result
(Lemma 9). The result is as follows.
Theorem 2. An average choice is continuous linear Luce rationalizable iff it satisfies
independence, continuity and path independence.
3.2. Strictly affine Luce model
A stochastic choice ρ : A → ∆(X) is a strictly affine Luce rule if there is v ∈ Rn and
β ∈ R such that
ρ(x,A) =
v · x+ β∑
y∈A(v · y + β)
.
In the linear model, u is ordinally equivalent to a linear function of x. The so-called
strictly affine model has u being an affine transformation of a linear model. Independence
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is not sufficient to obtain this model and we need a stronger axiom; an axiom that
allows us to measure the effects of moving close to an alternative. This axiom is termed
calibration:
Calibration:
ρ∗({λx+ (1− λ)y, λy + (1− λ)x}) = ρ∗({x, y}) + 2λ(1− λ)(x+ y − ρ∗({x, y}))
Calibration requires that “symmetric” combinations:
λx+ (1− λ)y and λy + (1− λ)x
correctly reflect the magnitude of λ. Think of the vectors λx+(1−λ)y and λy+(1−λ)x
as two independent lotteries. The following diagram represents the two lotteries.
ρ∗
y
x
y
x
x
y
1− λ
1− λ
λ
λ
1− λ
λ
Given the two independent lotteries: with probability λ2 you draw x and then y; and
with probability (1− λ)2 you draw y then x. Either way you get ρ({x, y}). The problem
is when you draw two x or two y. Then you get ρ({x, x}) = x or ρ∗({y, y}) = y. This
happens with probability 2λ(1− λ). So what we get is ρ∗({x, y}) and a “compensation”
(x+ y − ρ∗({x, y})) in the event that we draw two x or two y. This is multiplied by the
probability of that event.
Theorem 3. An average choice is strictly affine Luce rationalizable iff it satisfies cali-
bration, independence, continuity and path independence.
4. Discussion
An axiomatic characterization serves two kinds of purposes. One is that the ideas behind
the axioms give some qualitative meaning to a quantitative model of choice. Path inde-
pendence captures a procedural approach to choice: this idea is most clearly captured
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zρ∗({x, y})
ρ∗({x, y, z})
Figure 2: Path independence and Luces’ IIA.
by Plott’s version of path independence. Plott’s notion is too strong in our environment:
we discuss these issues in Section 4.2.
Our second axiom, continuity, takes the form it takes because of a well-known phe-
nomenon in stochastic choice. This is discussed in 4.3.
The other use of an axiomatic characterization is that it provides a test for the
theory. Luce’s model is the most widely used model of discrete choice. While you read
this paper, dozens of economists are hard at work estimating hundreds of Luce models
(Logit models) of choice. But Luce’s characterization of the model relies on stochastic
choice as primitive, we argue that there are practical empirical advantages to testing
Luce’s model using average choice. These are discussed in Section 4.4.
In the first place, however, we turn to a theoretical discussion of Luce’s and our
axiomatization of the Luce model.
4.1. Path independence and Luce’s IIA.
Luce (1959) takes a stochastic choice ρ as primitive, and shows that Luce’s rue emerges
from the axiom:
ρ(x, {x, y})
ρ(y, {x, y}) =
ρ(x,A)
ρ(y, A)
for any A 3 x, y. It is interesting to consider the relation between IIA and path indepen-
dence.
Figure 2 exhibits a violation of path independence. The average choice ρ∗({x, y, z})
is not on the line connecting z with ρ∗({x, y}. Instead, ρ∗({x, y, z}) is above the line. If
we write ρ∗({x, y, z}) as a weighted average of the vectors x, y and z, then this means
that the relative weight places on x, relative to the weight place on y, is clearly higher
12
z w
y
x
ρ∗(A \ {y})
z w
y
x
ρ∗(A \ {x})
z w
y
x
Figure 3: Violation of path independence; A = {x, y, z, w}.
than the relative weight places on x in ρ∗({x, y}). This would be a violation of Luce’s
IIA, when the weights are choice probabilities.
So it is easy to see, at least in some special cases, how path independence is related
to IIA. It is not, however, so easy to prove Theorem 1 using IIA. Consider the violation
of path independence in Figure 3.
Figure 3 exhibits a violation of path independence. The figure has the average choice
from some subsets of A = {x, y, z, w}, and these choices are incompatible with path
independence. It is easy to draw violations of path independence, but Figure 3 illustrates
that the axiom can be violated given only information about the average choice from
{x, z, w} and {y, z, w}. This information does not allow us to reduce the problem to
a violation IIA because we cannot relate the probability weights in a larger set to the
probability weights in the smaller set.
The diagram on the left shows where ρ∗({x, z, w}) is in conv{x, z, w}, while the dia-
gram in the middle depicts ρ∗({y, z, w}) in conv{y, z, w}. It should be clear, as illustrated
in the diagram on the right of Figure 3, that path independence cannot be satisfied be-
cause the lines x–ρ∗(A \ {x}) and y–ρ∗(A \ {y}) do not cross.
The example in Figure 3 because it shows how the average choice at sets of smaller
cardinality pin down uniquely the average choice at sets of larger cardinality. Luce’s IIA
cannot be used in the same way. To check for IIA, as suggested by Figure 2, requires the
probability weights to be unique, but this is only possible for affinely independent sets
of vectors. So it is only possible for sets A of small cardinality. Our proof of Theorem 1
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also works inductively over the cardinality of A, but path independence (in contrast to
IIA) does pin down average choice in a way that makes Luce’s model unavoidable.
4.2. Plott path independence
Path indepence was introduced to choice theory by Plott (1973). In our model, Plott’s
notion of path independence translates into the axiom:
Plott path independence: If convA ∩ convB = ∅ then
ρ∗(A ∪B) = ρ∗ ({ρ∗(A), ρ∗(B)}) .
The idea is that all that matters for choosing from A∪B are the choices from A and
from B. Once we know ρ∗(A) and ρ∗(B) there is no more relevant information in the
original sets A and B.
It is important to see how our path independence axiom weakens Plott’s. We require
only that ρ∗(A ∪ B) be a convex combination of ρ∗(A) and ρ∗(B)}, but the weights in
this convex combination does not need to coincide with the weights in the choice from
the set {ρ∗(A), ρ∗(B)}. So the elements of A ∪ B are allowed to influence the average
choice ρ∗(A ∪B) by way of affecting the weights placed on ρ∗(A) and ρ∗(B)}.
There is an extensive literature following the work of Plott. The most relevant for
our purposes is Kalai and Megiddo (1980) and Machina and Parks (1981), who argue
that Plott path independence is too strong an axiom in our framework. It is particularly
simple to see Kalai’s, Megiddo’s, Machina’s, and Park’s point when we talk about Luce
rationalizable average choice.
Proposition 4. If an average choice is continuous Luce rationalizable, then it cannot
satisfy Plott path independence.
Proof. Let ρ∗ be an average choice that is continuous Luce rationalizable, and let u :
X → R++ be the continuous utility function in the Luce model that rationalizes ρ∗.
Suppose towards a contradiction that ρ∗ satisfies Plott path independence.
Fix any affinely independent x, y, z ∈ X. Then Plott path independence implies that
ρ∗({x, y, z}) = ρ∗(ρ∗({x, y}), {z}) = u(ρ
∗({x, y}))ρ∗({x, y}) + u(z)z
u(ρ∗({x, y})) + u(z) .
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But at the same time, ρ∗({x, y, z}) also equals
u(x)x+ u(y)y + u(z)z
u(x) + u(y) + u(z)
.
Affine independence then implies that
u(z)
u(x) + u(y) + u(z)
=
u(z)
u(ρ∗({x, y})) + u(z) .
Then u(z) > 0 gives that
u(ρ∗({x, y})) = u
(
u(x)x+ u(y)y
u(x) + u(y)
)
= u(x) + u(y).
One can choose y arbitrarily close to x such that x, y, z are affinely independent. There-
fore, continuity of u would imply that u(x) = 2u(x), which is impossible as u(x) > 0.
4.3. Debreu’s example
The continuity axiom we are using is perhaps not the first such axiom one would think
of (it certainly was not the first we thought of). A stronger axiom would demand that
ρ∗ is continuous, but this is incompatible with the Luce rule.
It is interesting to see why, as it relates the the famous “blue bus – red bus” example
of Debreu (1960) and Tversky (1972). Suppose that an agent has to choose a mode of
transportation. Choosing x means taking a bus while choosing y means taking a cab.3
Alternative z is also a bus, but of a different color from x. Debreu argues that the
presence of z should matter for the relative probability of choosing x over y, as the agent
would consider whether to take a bus or a taxi and then be indifferent over which bus to
take.
To see the connection to Debreu’s example, suppose that ρ∗ is continuous Luce ratio-
nalizable, with a continuous function u. Let zn be a sequence in X converging to x ∈ X.
Then
ρ∗({x, y}) 6= 2u(x)x+ u(y)y
2u(x) + u(y)
= lim
n→∞
ρ∗({x, y, zn}).
Thus ρ∗ must be discontinuous.
3Actually Debreu talked about two different recordings of the same Beethoven symphony vs. a suite
by Debussy; but the literature has preferred buses and cabs.
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The lack of continuity of ρ∗ is reminiscent of the blue bus-red bus example. The
lack of continuity results because the Luce model demands that zn be irrelevant for the
relative choice of x over y, even when zn becomes very similar to x. In that sense, the
lack of continuity of ρ∗ is related to the blue bus-red bus phenomenon.
4.4. Sampling error
Theoretical studies of stochastic choice assume that choice probabilities are observed
perfectly. But we intend our axioms to be useful as empirical tests, so that one can
empirically decide whether observed data are consistent with the theory.
In an empirical study, however, choice probabilities must be estimated from sample
frequencies. In the individual interpretation of the stochastic choice model (see the
discussion in the Introduction), one agent would make a choice repeatedly from a set
of available alternatives. This allows us to estimate the stochastic choice, but not to
perfectly observe it. In the population interpretation (again, see the Introduction) we
can observe the choices of a group of agents. The group may be large, and the fraction
with which an agent makes a choice may be close to the population fraction of that
choice, but there is likely some important randomness due to sampling. Here we want to
argue that our axiomatization is better suited to dealing with such errors.
In his discussion of the Luce mode, Luce (1959) makes the point that testing his
axiom, IIA, requires a large sample size. We follow up on Luce’s remark and compare
the efficiency of the IIA test statistic with the test statistic neded to test for path inde-
pendence, the average of the choices.
Fix a set of alternatives A. Suppose that the population choices from A are given
by p ∈ ∆(A), which comes from some continuous Luce rule u : X → R++. We do not
observe p but instead a sample X1, . . . , Xn of choices, with Xi ∈ A for i = 1, . . . , n. The
Xi are independent, and distributed according to p. The probability p is estimated from
the empirical distribution:
pnx =
|i : Xi = x|
n
.
We have two possibilities to test the Luce model:
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1. Test the model using Luce’s original axiomatization, by computing relative proba-
bilities
pnx
pny
,
for x, y ∈ A.
2. Test the model using our axiomatization, by computing average choice:
µn =
∑
x∈A
xpnx
We argue that option (2) is better for two reasons. One is that in small samples it
is more reliable to use the average than to use relative probabilities. The other is that,
even in a large sample, the test statistic in (1) can have a very large variance relative to
the test statistic in (2). Specifically, for any M there is an instance of the Luce model in
which the asymptotic variance of the statistic in (1) is M times the asymptotic variance
of the statistic in (2).
We proceed to formalize the second claim.
Standard calculations (see Appendix B) yield:
√
n
(
pnx
pny
− px
py
)
d−→ N
(
0,
√
px
np2y
[
1 +
px
py
])
On the other hand,
√
n(µn − µ) d−→ N(0,Σ), where
Σ = (σl,h) and σl,h =
∑
x∈A
∑
y∈A\x
−xlyhpxpy +
∑
x∈A
xlxhpx(1− px).
It is obvious that the entries of Σ are bounded and the asymptotic variance of pnx/p
n
y
can be taken to be as large as desired by choosing a Luce model in which u(x)/u(y) is
large. So for any M there is a Luce model for which the asymptotic variance of pna/p
n
b
relative to max{σl,h}, the largest element of Σ, is greater than M .
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5. Proof of Theorem 1
5.1. Definitions from convex analysis
Let x, y ∈ Rn. The line passing through x and y is the set {x+ θ(y − x) : θ ∈ R}. The
line segment joining x and y is the set {x+ θ(y−x) : θ ∈ [0, 1]}. A subset of Rn is affine
if it contains the line passing through any two of its members. A subset of Rn is convex
if it contains the line segment joining any two of its members.
If A is a subset of Rn, the affine hull of A is the intersection of all affine subsets of
Rn that contain A. An affine combination of members of A is any finite sum
∑l
i=1 λixi
with λi ∈ R and xi ∈ A i = 1, . . . , l and
∑l
i=1 λi = 1. The affine hull of A is equivalently
the collection of all affine combinations of its members. If A is a subset of Rn, the convex
hull of A is the intersection of all convex subsets of Rn that contain A. A set A is affinely
independent if none of its members can be written as an affine combination of the rest
of the members of A.
A point x ∈ A is relative interior for A if there is a neighborhood N of x in Rn
such that the intersection of N with the affine hull of A is contained in A. The relative
interior of A is the set of points x ∈ A that are relative interior for A.
A polytope is the convex hull of a finite set of points. The dimension of a polytope
P is l − 1 if l the largest cardinality of an affinely independent subset of A. A vector
x ∈ A is an extreme point of a set A if it cannot be written as the convex combination
of the rest of the members of A. A face of a convex set A is a convex subset F ⊆ A
with the property that if x, y ∈ A and (x + y)/2 ∈ F then x, y ∈ F . If F is a face
of a polyope P , then F is also a polytope and there is α ∈ Rn and β ∈ R such that
P ⊆ {x ∈ Rn : α · x ≤ β} and F = {x ∈ P : α · x = β}. If a polytope has dimension l
then it has faces of dimension 0, 1, . . . , l (Corollary 2.4.8 in Schneider (2013)).
5.2. Proof
The following axiom seems to be weaker than path independence, but it is not.
18
One-point path independence:
ρ∗(A) ∈ conv0{x, ρ∗(A \ {x})}.
We use one-point path independence in the proof of sufficiency in Theorem 1. Since
path independence is satisfied by any continuous Luce rationalizable average choice,
one-point path independence and path independence are equivalent (at least under the
hypothesis of continuity).
We now proceed with the formal proof. The first lemma establishes necessity, and is
also needed in the proof of sufficiency.
Lemma 5. If ρ∗ is continuous Luce rationalizable, then it satisfies continuity and path
independence.
Proof. Continuity of the average choice is a direct consequence of the continuity of u.
Path independence is also simple: Note that when convA∩ convB = ∅ then A and B are
disjoint. So it follows that(∑
x∈A
u(x) +
∑
y∈B
u(x)
)
ρ∗(A ∪B) =
∑
x∈A
u(x)x+
∑
x∈B
u(x)x
= ρ∗(A)
∑
x∈A
u(x) + ρ∗(B)
∑
x∈B
u(x);
whence
ρ∗(A ∪B) ∈ conv0{ρ∗(A), ρ∗(B)},
as
∑
x∈A u(x) > 0 and
∑
x∈B u(x) > 0.
The proof of the sufficiency of the axioms relies on two key ideas. One is that when
A is affinely independent, ρ∗(A) has a unique representation as a convex combination of
the elements of A. The other is the following lemma, which is used to show that path
independence determines average choice uniquely.
Lemma 6. Suppose that ρ∗ satisfies one-point path independence. Let A be a finite set
with |A| ≥ 3, and let x, y ∈ A with x 6= y. If x and y are extreme points of A and there
is a proper face F of conv(A) with dim(F ) ≥ 1 and x, y ∈ F , then:
conv0({x, ρ∗(A \ {x})}) ∩ conv0({y, ρ∗(A \ {y})})
is a singleton.
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Proof. First, ρ∗(A) ∈ conv0{x, ρ∗(A \ {x})} and ρ∗(A) ∈ conv0{y, ρ∗(A \ {y})}, as ρ∗
satisfies one-point path independence. So
∅ 6= conv0{x, ρ∗(A \ {x})} ∩ conv0{y, ρ∗(A \ {y})}.
Since x, y ∈ F there is a vector p and a scalar α with F ⊆ {z ∈ X : p · z = α} –one
of the hyperplanes supporting convA– and such that convA ⊆ {z ∈ X : p · z ≥ α}. We
shall prove that if there is
z1, z2 ∈ conv0{x, ρ∗(A \ {x})} ∩ conv0{y, ρ∗(A \ {y})},
with z1 6= z2, then A ⊆ F , contradicting that F is a proper face of conv(A).
Now, z1, z2 ∈ conv0{x, ρ∗(A \ {x})} implies that there is θx, θρ∗(A\{x}) ∈ R such that
x = z2 + θx(z
1 − z2) and ρ∗(A \ {x}) = z2 + θρ∗(A\{x})(z1 − z2). Similarly, we have
y = z2 + θy(z
1 − z2) and ρ∗(A \ {y}) = z2 + θρ∗(A\{y})(z1 − z2).
As a consequence then of p · x = α = p · y we have
p · z2 + θxp · (z1 − z2) = p · z2 + θyp · (z1 − z2).
Since θx 6= θy (as x 6= y) we obtain that p · (z1 − z2) = 0. So
α = p · x = p · z2 + p · θx(z1 − z2) = p · z2.
Then
p · ρ∗(A \ {x}) = p · (z2 + θρ∗(A\{x})(z1 − z2)) = p · z2 = α.
But ρ∗(A \ {x}) = ∑z∈A\{x} λzz for some λz > 0, as ρ∗(A \ {x}) is in the relative interior
of conv(A \ {x}). Then p · z ≥ α for all z ∈ A implies that p · z = α for all z ∈ A \ {x}.
This means that A ⊆ F , contradicting that F is a proper face of convA.
The proof of sufficiency proceeds by first constructing a stochastic choice ρ, then
arguing that it is a Luce rule that rationalizes ρ∗. The first step is to define ρ(A) for A
with |A| = 2. Then we define ρ(A) for A with |A| = 3, and finally we define ρ on all of
A by constructing a continuous Luce rule, and using this rule to define ρ. The average
choice defined from the Luce rule must be path independent, so Lemma 6 is used to show
that the average choice from the constructed Luce rule coincides with ρ∗.
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Let x, y ∈ X, x 6= y. Since ρ∗({x, y}) is in the relative interior of {x, y} there
is a unique θ ∈ (0, 1) with ρ∗({x, y}) = θx + (1 − θ)y. Define ρ(x, {x, y}) = θ and
ρ(y, {x, y}) = 1− θ. Note that ρ(x, {x, y}) is a continuous function of x and y.
Thus we have defined ρ(A) for A with |A| = 2. Now turn to A with |A| = 3.
Let A = {x, y, z}. Consider the case when the vectors x, y and z are affinely in-
dependent. Such collections of three vectors exist because |P | ≥ 3. Then there are
unique ρ(x,A) ρ(y, A) and ρ(z, A) (non-negative and adding up to 1) such that ρ∗(A) =
xρ(x,A) + yρ(y, A) + zρ(z, A). Since ρ∗(A) is in the relative interior of conv(A) in fact,
ρ(x,A), ρ(y, A), ρ(z, A) > 0.
By path independence, there is θ such that
ρ∗(A) = θz + (1− θ)ρ∗(A \ {z}) = θz + (1− θ)[xρ(x, {x, y}) + yρ(y, {x, y})].
The vectors x, y and z are affinely independent, so the weights ρ(x,A), ρ(y, A) and
ρ(z, A) are unique, which implies that ρ(x,A) = (1 − θ)ρ(x, {x, y}) and ρ(y, A) = (1 −
θ)ρ(y, {x, y}). Hence
ρ(x,A)
ρ(y, A)
=
ρ(x, {x, y})
ρ(y, {x, y}) . (1)
Consider now the case when the vectors x, y and z are not affinely independent.
Choose a sequence {zn} such that
a) x, y and zn are affinely independent for all n,
b) z = limn→∞ zn,
c) and ρ({x, y, zn}) converges.
To see that it is possible to choose such a sequence, note that x, y and zn are affinely
independent if and only if x− zn and y − zn are not collinear. Now x− z and y − z are
collinear, so there is θ ∈ R with x− z = θ(y − z). For each n the ball with center z and
radius 1/n has full dimension, so the intersection of this ball with the complement in X
of the line passing through x and z (which is also the line passing through y and z) is
nonempty. By choosing zn in this ball, but outside of the line passing through x and z,
we obtain a sequence that converges to z Then we have that
(x− zn)i
(y − zn)i =
θ(y − z)i + (z − zn)i
(y − z) + (z − zn)i =
θ + (z−zn)i
(y−z)i
1 + (z−zn)i
(y−z)i
,
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a ratio that is not a constant function of i, as zn is not on the line passing through y and
z. Finally, by going to a subsequence if necessary, we can ensure that condition c) holds
because the simplex is compact. Define ρ({x, y, z}) to be the limit of ρ({x, y, zn}).
We have shown that Equation (1) holds for sets of three affinely independent vec-
tors. So ρ(x,A)/ρ(y, A) = ρ(x, {x, y})/ρ(y, {x, y}), as ρ(x, {x, y, zn})/ρ(y, {x, y, zn}) =
ρ(x, {x, y})/ρ(y, {x, y}) for all n. In particular, this means that ρ(x,A), ρ(y, A) ∈ (0, 1),
as ρ(x, {x, y}), ρ(y, {x, y}) ∈ (0, 1).
Again, the fact that Equation (1) holds for sets of three affinely independent vectors
implies:
ρ(zn, {x, y, zn})
ρ(y, {x, y, zn}) =
ρ(zn, {zn, y})
ρ(y, {zn, y}) →
ρ(z, {z, y})
ρ(y, {z, y})
as n → ∞. Then ρ(z, A)/ρ(y, A) = ρ(z, {z, y})/ρ(y, {z, y}). In particular, ρ(z, A) ∈
(0, 1) because ρ(z, {z, y}) ∈ (0, 1).
Thus we have established that, for any three distinct vectors x, y, z ∈ X (affinely
independent or not), Equation (1) holds with A = {x, y, z}.
Now we turn to the definition of ρ on A. The definition proceeds by induction. We
use (1) to define a utility function u : X → R++ and a Luce rule. Then we show by
induction, and using Lemma 6, that ρ rationalizes ρ∗.
Fix y0 ∈ X. Let u(y0) = 1. For all x ∈ X, let u(x) = ρ(x,{x,y0})ρ(y0,{x,y0}) . Note that u is a
continuous function, as x 7→ (ρ(x, {x, y}), ρ(y, {x, y})) is continuous, and that u > 0. By
Equation (1), we obtain
u(x)
u(y)
=
ρ(x, {x, y0})
ρ(y0, {x, y0})
ρ(y0, {y, y0})
ρ(x, {y, y0})
=
ρ(x, {x, y})
ρ(y, {x, y})
=
ρ(x, {x, y, z})
ρ(y, {x, y, z}) ,
for all x and y.
Let ρ(A) be the Luce rule defined by u. This definition coincides with the definition
of ρ we have given for A with |A| ≤ 3 because
u(x)
u(y)
=
ρ(x, {x, y})
ρ(y, {x, y}) and
u(x)
u(y)
=
ρ(x, {x, y, z})
ρ(y, {x, y, z})
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for all x, y, z ∈ X.
Note also that, by definition of ρ,
ρ∗({x, y}) = xρ(x, {x, y}) + yρ(y, {x, y})
and ρ∗({x, y, z}) = xρ(x, {x, y, z}) + yρ(y, {x, y, z}) + zρ(z, {x, y, z})
(2)
for all x, y, z ∈ X.
Let
ρ¯(A) =
∑
x∈A
xρ(x,A).
We shall prove that ρ¯(A) = ρ∗(A) for all A ∈ A, which finishes the proof of the theorem.
The proof proceeds by induction on the size of A. We have established (see Equa-
tion (2)) that ρ¯(A) = ρ∗(A) for |A| ≤ 3. Suppose then that ρ¯(A) = ρ∗(A) for all A ∈ A
with |A| ≤ k. Let A ∈ A with |A| = k + 1. We shall prove that ρ¯(A) = ρ∗(A).
Suppose first that dim(convA) ≥ 2. Then by Corollary 2.4.8 in Schneider (2013)
there is a proper face F of conv(A) with dimension ≥ 1. Let x, y ∈ A be two extreme
points of conv(A), such that x, y ∈ F . Such x and y exist because F has dimension at
least 1. Note that ρ¯(A \ {x}) = ρ∗(A \ {x}) ρ¯(A \ {y}) = ρ∗(A \ {y}) by the inductive
hypothesis. By Lemma 5, ρ¯ satisfies path independence. So Lemma 6 implies that
conv0({x, ρ¯(A\{x})})∩conv0({y, ρ¯(A\{y})}) = conv0({x, ρ∗(A\{x})})∩conv0({y, ρ∗(A\{y})})
is a singleton. Since ρ¯ and ρ∗ both satisfy path independence, ρ¯(A) = ρ∗(A).
In second place we consider the case when dim(A) = 1. Let z ∈ A be an extreme
point of convA. Let {zn} be a sequence with zn → z, such that A \ {z} ∪ {zn} has
dimension ≥ 2. This is possible because X has dimension larger than 3. The we obtain
that ρ¯(A) = ρ∗(A) by continuity of ρ∗ and ρ¯.
6. Proof of Theorems 2 and 3
Lemma 7. If ρ∗ is continuous linear Luce rationalizable, then it satisfies independence.
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Proof. Let ρ∗ be continuous linear Luce rationalizable, with u(x) = f(v · x). We check
that it satisfies independence. Note first that:
ρ∗({λx+ (1− λ)z, λy + (1− λ)z}) = µ(λx+ (1− λ)z) + (1− µ)(λy + (1− λ)z)
= λ(µx+ (1− µ)y) + (1− λ)z,
where
µ =
f(v · (λx+ (1− λ)z))
f(v · (λx+ (1− λ)z)) + f(v · (λy + (1− λ)z)) .
Suppose first that u(x) = u(y). Then v · x = v · y, as f is monotone increasing.
Then f(v · (λx + (1 − λ)z)) = f(v · (λy + (1 − λ)z)). This means that µ = 1/2. So
µx+ (1− µ)y = ρ∗({x, y}), because u(x) = u(y) implies that ρ∗({x, y}) = 1
2
x+ 1
2
y.
Conversely, suppose that for all λ and all z such that λx+(1−λ)z, λy+(1−λ)z ∈ X
ρ∗({λx+ (1− λ)z, λy + (1− λ)z}) = λρ∗({x, y}) + (1− λ)z,
but (towards a contradiction) that u(x) 6= u(y). Say that u(x) > u(y). Choose z
and λ such that µ > 1/2, where µ is such that ρ∗({λx + (1 − λ)z, λy + (1 − λ)z}) =
µ(λx + (1 − λ)z) + (1 − µ)(λy + (1 − λ)z) (which can be done by the continuity of u).
Then ρ∗({x, y}) 6= µx+ (1− µ)y, a contradiction.
Let ρ∗ be continuous Luce rationalizable with utility function u. Write x ∼ y when
u(x) = u(y).
Lemma 8. If ρ∗ satisfies independence then it satisfies the following property:
x ∼ y iff ∀λ ∈ R∀z ∈ X(λx+(1−λ)z, λy+(1−λ)z ∈ X =⇒ λx+(1−λ)z ∼ λy+(1−λ)z)
Proof. Let x ∼ y, λ ∈ (0, 1) and z ∈ X. Let µ be such that
ρ∗({λx+ (1− λ)z, λy + (1− λ)z}) = µ(λx+ (1− λ)z) + (1− µ)(λy + (1− λ)z)
= λ(µx+ (1− µ)y) + (1− λ)z.
Then independence implies that
λ(µx+ (1−µ)y) + (1−λ)z = ρ∗({λx+ (1−λ)z, λy+ (1−λ)z}) = λρ∗({x, y}) + (1−λ)z,
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and thus µx+ (1− µ)y = ρ∗({x, y}) Since x ∼ y we must have µ = 1/2. Hence
1
2
=
u(λx+ (1− λ)z)
u(λx+ (1− λ)z) + u(λy + (1− λ)z) .
Therefore λx+ (1− λ)z ∼ λy + (1− λ)z.
Conversely, if λx+(1−λ)z ∼ λy+(1−λ)z for all λ and all z then x ∼ y by continuity
of u and the fact that λx+ (1− λ)z, λy + (1− λ)z ∈ X.
The property in Lemma 8 is weaker than the standard von-Neuman Morgenstern inde-
pendence property (restricted to λ ∈ (0, 1)). Using Lemma 8, however, we can establish
the stronger independence property, as stated in the next lemma. Then the proof of
Theorem 2 follows from the expected utility theorem: the preference relation represented
by u is a weak order, it satisfies continuity (as u is continuous), and independence.
Lemma 9. If ρ∗ is continuous Luce rationalizable, and it satisfies independence, then it
satisfies the following property
u(x) ≥ u(y) iff ∀λ ∈ [0, 1]∀z ∈ X u(λx+ (1− λ)z) ≥ u(λy + (1− λ)z).
Proof. Note that by Lemma 8, independence implies that
x ∼ y iff x+ θ(z − x) ∼ y + θ(z − y)
for all scalars θ and for all z.
Suppose towards a contradiction that u(x) ≥ u(y) but that u(λx+(1−λ)z) < u(λy+
(1−λ)z). By continuity of u there is λ∗ < λ such that u(λx+(1−λ)z) = u(λy+(1−λ)z).
Let λ∗x+ (1− λ∗)z = x′. Then x = x′− 1−λ∗
λ∗ (z− x′). Similarly, y = y′− 1−λ
∗
λ∗ (z− y′)
where λ∗y+(1−λ∗)z = y′. Then independence and u(x′) = u(y′) implies that u(x) = u(y).
Then u(λx+ (1− λ)z) < u(λy + (1− λ)z) is a violation of independence.
6.1. Proof of Theorem 3
By Theorem 2, a strictly affine Luce rationalizable rule satisfies independence, continuity
and path independence. Lemma 10 establishes that Calibration is also necessary for the
rule to be strictly affine Luce rationalizable.
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For necessity, we know that path independence, continuity and independence imply
that an average choice rule is linear Luce rationalizable. Lemma 11 finishes the proof by
establishing that calibration is sufficient for the linear Luce rule to be strictly affine.
Lemma 10. The strictly affine Luce model satisfies calibration
Proof. Let w = λx+ (1− λ)y and w′ = λy + (1− λ)x. Note that
v · w + v · w′ = v · x+ v · y.
Therefore,
ρ∗({λx+ (1− λ)y, λy + (1− λ)x})
=
(v · w + β)(λx+ (1− λ)y) + (v · w′ + β)(λy + (1− λ)x)
(v · x+ β) + (v · y + β) .
Note that
(v · w + β)(λx+ (1− λ)y) + (v · w′ + β)(λy + (1− λ)x)
is:
(λv · x+ (1− λ)v · y + β)(λx+ (1− λ)y) + (λv · y + (1− λ)v · x+ β)(λy + (1− λ)x)
= ((λ2 + (1− λ)2)v · x+ 2λ(1− λ)v · y)x
+((λ2 + (1− λ)2)v · y + 2λ(1− λ)v · x)y
+β(λx+ (1− λ)y + λy + (1− λ)x)
= ((λ2 + (1− λ)2)v · x+ 2λ(1− λ)v · y)x+ ((λ2 + (1− λ)2)v · y + 2λ(1− λ)v · x)y
+β(x+ y).
Hence,
ρ∗({λx+ (1− λ)y, λy + (1− λ)x})
=(λ2 + (1− λ)2) v · xx+ v · yy
(v · x+ β) + (v · y + β) + 2λ(1− λ)
v · yx+ v · xy
(v · x+ β) + (v · y + β)
+
β(x+ y)
(v · x+ β) + (v · y + β)
=(λ2 + (1− λ)2)(v · x+ β)x+ (v · y + β)y
(v · x+ β) + (v · y + β) + 2λ(1− λ)
(v · y + β)x+ (v · x+ β)y
(v · x+ β) + (v · y + β)
=(λ2 + (1− λ)2)ρ∗({x, y}) + 2λ(1− λ)(x+ y − ρ∗({x, y})).
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Lemma 11. Let ρ∗ be a linear Luce rationalizable, with utility function u(x) = f(v · .x).
Suppose that ρ∗ satisfies calibration. Then there is α > 0 and β such that f(v · x) =
αv · x+ β for all x ∈ X.
Proof. By the calibration axiom, for all x, y ∈ X and λ ∈ [0, 1],
λf(v · w) + (1− λ)f(v · w′)
f(v · w) + f(v · w′) =
(λ2 + (1− λ)2)f(v · x) + 2λ(1− λ)f(v · y)
f(v · x) + f(v · y) ,
where w = λx+ (1− λ)y and w′ = λy + (1− λ)x.
Let V = {a ∈ R|v · x = a for some x ∈ X}. Then, the above equation implies that
for all λ ∈ [0, 1] \ {1
2
} and a, b ∈ V ,
λf(λa+ (1− λ)b) + (1− λ)f(λb+ (1− λ)a)
f(λa+ (1− λ)b) + f(λb+ (1− λ)a) =
(λ2 + (1− λ)2)f(a) + 2λ(1− λ)f(b)
f(a) + f(b)
= λ
λf(a) + (1− λ)f(b)
f(a) + f(b)
+ (1− λ)(1− λ)f(a) + λf(b)
f(a) + f(b)
.
Let
A =
f(λa+ (1− λ)b)
f(λa+ (1− λ)b) + f(λb+ (1− λ)a) and B =
λf(a) + (1− λ)f(b)
f(a) + f(b)
.
Then λA+ (1− λ)(1− A) = λB + (1− λ)(1−B), so that A = B.
Step 1: For all λ ∈ [0, 1] \ {1
2
} and a, b ∈ V , f(λa+ (1− λ)b) > λf(a) + (1− λ)f(b)⇔
f(λb+ (1− λ)a) < λf(b) + (1− λ)f(a).
Proof of Step 1: If f(λa + (1 − λ)b) < λf(a) + (1 − λ)f(b), then A = B implies that
f(λa+(1−λ)b)+f(λb+(1−λ)a) > f(a)+f(b). So λf(a)+(1−λ)f(b)+f(λb+(1−λ)a) >
f(a) + f(b). Therefore, f(λb+ (1− λ)a) > λf(b) + (1− λ)f(a).
Conversely, if f(λa + (1 − λ)b) > λf(a) + (1 − λ)f(b), then A = B implies that
f(λa+(1−λ)b)+f(λb+(1−λ)a) < f(a)+f(b). So λf(a)+(1−λ)f(b)+f(λb+(1−λ)a) <
f(a) + f(b). Therefore, f(λb+ (1− λ)a) < λf(b) + (1− λ)f(a).
Step 2: f(1
2
a+ 1
2
b) = 1
2
f(a) + 1
2
f(b) for all a, b ∈ V .
Proof of Step 2: Suppose that f(1
2
a+ 1
2
b) 6= 1
2
f(a) + 1
2
f(b) for some a, b ∈ V . Without
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loss of generality, assume f(1
2
a+ 1
2
b) > 1
2
f(a) + 1
2
f(b). Define for all λ ∈ [0, 1],
d(λ) = f(λa+ (1− λ)b)− λf(a) + (1− λ)f(b).
Then by Step 1, we must have for all λ ∈ [0, 1] \ {1
2
},
d(λ) > 0⇔ d(1− λ) < 0.
and d(1
2
) > 0. Since d is continuous, there exists a positve number ε such that d(1
2
+ε) > 0
and d(1
2
− ε) > 0. This is a contradiction. So we have f(1
2
a+ 1
2
b) = 1
2
f(a) + 1
2
f(b) for all
a, b ∈ V .
Step 3: f(λa+ (1− λ)b) = λf(a) + (1− λ)f(b) for all a, b ∈ V and λ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Step 3: Suppose toward contradiction that there exist a, b ∈ V and λ ∈ (0, 1)
such that f(λa + (1 − λ)b) 6= λf(a) + (1 − λ)f(b). Without loss of generality, assume
that a < b.
Consider the case where f(λa+ (1− λ)b) > λf(a) + (1− λ)f(b). Define a function g
as follows: for all x ∈ V
g(x) = f(x)− f(b)− f(a)
b− a (x− a)− f(a).
Note that
g(λa+ (1− λ)b) = f(λa+ (1− λ)b)− f(b)− f(a)
b− a (λa+ (1− λ)b− a)− f(a)
> λf(a) + (1− λ)f(b)− (1− λ)(f(b)− f(a))− f(a)
= 0.
So supx∈[a,b] g(x) > 0. Define γ ≡ supx∈[a,b] g(x).
Moreover, g(a) = g(b) = 0. By Step 2,
g
(x+ y
2
)
= f
(x+ y
2
)
− f(b)− f(a)
b− a
(x+ y
2
− a
)
− f(a)
=
g(x) + g(y)
2
.
Define c = inf{x ∈ [a, b]|g(x) = γ}. Since g is continuous (because f is continuous),
g(c) = γ. Since γ > 0, it must be that c ∈ (a, b). For any h > 0 such that c + h ∈ (a, b)
and c− h ∈ (a, b), we have that g(c− h) < g(c) and g(c+ h) ≤ g(c). Hence, by Step 2,
g(c) =
g(c− h) + g(c+ h)
2
<
g(c) + g(c)
2
= g(c),
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which is a contradiction.
We can obtain a contrdiction in the same way in the case where f(λa + (1− λ)b) <
λf(a) + (1− λ)f(b).
So we have proved that there is α > 0 and β such that f(v · x) = αv · x + β for all
x ∈ X. We redefine v as v = αv. So we finished the proof of Theorem 3.
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Appendix A. Appendix
The following result is standard in convex analysis (see for example Theorem 1.1.14 in
Schneider (2013)). We include a proof for convenience.
Lemma 12. Let A ⊆ Rn be a finite set. Then x is in the relative interior of conv(A) iff
there exists (λa)a∈A such that x =
∑
a∈A λaa,
∑
a∈A λa = 1 and λa > 0 for all a ∈ A.
Proof. Let A∗ = {l ∈ A|there exists no {ri} ⊂ A, {αi} s.t. l =
∑
αiri}. Since ρ∗(A) ∈
conv(A), by Choquet theorem, there exists ρ such that ρ∗(A) =
∑
a∈A∗ aρ(a,A). If
A = A∗, there is nothing to prove. Consider the case A \ A∗ 6= ∅.
Since A is finite, we can write A∗ = {r1, . . . , rm} and A\A∗ = {a1, . . . , an}. By defini-
tion, for each aj, there exist αj ∈ [0, 1]m such that aj = ∑mi=1 αj(i)ri and ∑mi=1 αj(i) = 1.
For each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, choose a positive number εj such that for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
n∑
j=1
εjα
j(i) < ρ(ri, A).
Define ρ′ as follows: for each i, define ρ′(ri, A) = ρ(ri, A)−∑nj=1 εjαj(i), for each aj, define
ρ′(aj, A) = εj. By the deifnition of ε, ρ′(a,A) > 0 for all a ∈ A. To finish the proof, we
need to show
∑
a∈A ρ
′(a,A) = 1 (so that ρ′(A) ∈ ∆(A)) and ∑a∈A a(x)ρ′(a,A) = ρ∗(A).∑
a∈A
ρ′(a,A) =
m∑
i=1
ρ′(ri, A) +
n∑
j=1
ρ′(aj, A)
=
m∑
i=1
(
ρ(ri, A)−
n∑
j=1
εjα
j(i)
)
+
n∑
j=1
εj
=
m∑
i=1
ρ(ri, A)−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
εjα
j(i) +
n∑
j=1
εj
=
m∑
i=1
ρ(ri, A)−
n∑
j=1
εj
( m∑
i=1
αj(i)
)
+
n∑
j=1
εj
=
m∑
i=1
ρ(ri, A) (∵
m∑
i=1
αj(i) = 1)
= 1.
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Hence, ρ′ ∈ ∆(A). Moreover, for each x ∈ P ,∑
a∈A
a(x)ρ′(a,A) =
m∑
i=1
ri(x)ρ′(ri, A) +
n∑
j=1
aj(x)ρ′(aj, A)
=
m∑
i=1
ri(x)ρ′(ri, A) +
n∑
j=1
( m∑
i=1
αj(i)ri(x)
)
ρ′(aj, A)
=
m∑
i=1
ri(x)
(
ρ(ri, A)−
n∑
j=1
εjα
j(i)
)
+
n∑
j=1
( m∑
i=1
αj(i)ri(x)
)
εj
=
m∑
i=1
ri(x)ρ(ri, A)
=
∑
a∈A∗
a(x)ρ(a,A)
= ρ∗(x,A).
So
∑
a∈A a(x)ρ
′(a,A) = ρ∗(A).
Appendix B. Calculations from Section 4.4
We have Epnx = px/n, Vp
n
x = px(1 − px)/n and Cov(pnx, pny ) = −pxpy when y 6= x.
Moreover, the central limit theorem implies that
√
n(pnx − px) d−→ N(0,
√
px(1− px)).
Then, using the delta method and the following calculation yields the result in the text:
V
(
pnx
pny
− px
py
)
=
(
1
py
)2
Vpnx +
(−px
p2y
)2
Vpny +
2
py
−px
p2y
(−pxpy)
=
1
np2y
[
px(1− px) + p
2
x
p2y
py(1− py) + 2px
]
=
px
np2y
[
(1 + px) +
px
py
(1− py)
]
=
px
np2y
[
1 +
px
py
]
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